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Introduction 
Chapter 5 
Land Ownership: Caste and 
Economic Status 
In this chapter I will be examining some of the features of the system 
of land tenure in Rajasthan and an!llysing the distribution of land 
ownership in Hinganiya. The underlying ~m is to demonstrate the biased 
distribution of land ownership particularly along caste lines and to 
examine the extent to which landownership and caste are related. The 
working hypothesis is that there is a land-wealth nexus. In later chapters I 
will examine the points at which wealth and landownership diverge. 
One of my aims is to show how hierarchical systems based on caste 
and landownership are related and how they diverge. From the point of 
view of the study as a whole, I wish to show how the higher positions in 
these hierarchies provide advantages in situations of recurring drought. 
This is readily understandable in the case of landownership: it seems 
reasonable to expect that those with more land are in a better position to 
cope in bad years. In later chapters I will bring together the other strand 
of the argument which I have been developing: that membership of 
particular castes (especially higher ranked castes) may also provide 
economic opportunities distinct from those associated with 
landownership. However, it is first necessary to show the relationships 
between the two hierarchies. 
The chapter will begin with a discussion of systems of land tenure and 
the history of land reform in Rajasthan. A section on the relationship 
between the household as an institution and land ownership and 
inheritance will follow. I will then discuss the nature of the land records 
and some of the problems in interpreting them. Some of the theoretical 
problems involved in establishing a model of the rural class system in 
western Riljasthan will also be considered before I turn to a description 
and analysis of land distribution in Hinganiya itself. 
Land Tenure and Land Reform in Rajasthan 
(a) The Jagir System 
In my discussion of the Rajput Caste (Chapter 4), I briefly described 
the relationship between the Thakur landlords and the Maharajah under 
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the Jagir system. I will now discuss land tenure under the system in 
greater detail, before looking at land reform legislation in Rajasthan. 
Prior to the land reforms of the 1950s, land tenure in western 
Rajasthan was characterised by a complex variety of grants from rulers to 
various local landlords, who acted as intermediaries between the rulers 
and the people who actually farmed the land as tenants. The history of the 
development of the Rajput states is in large part the history of the 
development of loose ties between local chieftains and rulers into a fairly 
rigid hierarchy. 
It is possible to simplify this and to look at the process as essentially a 
two-stage one. Sharma (1977), in a history of the State of Marwar, sees 
the restructuring of Marwar polity along the lines of the Mughaljagirdari 
system as the crucial turning point in this process. From the beginning of 
the thirteenth century there were a number of small principalities spread 
throughout western Rajasthan. The boundaries of these small 
principalities were ill-defined and often ill-defended. The Maharajahs of 
Marwar appointed sardars (mostly from members of their own clans) to 
rule over villages. Rao Chunda (cl383-1423 A.D.) created another 
category of fiefs by recognising existing chiefs as bhomias and 
established marital ties with these bhomias. This early system was called 
bhai-bant (literally 'brother-bond') and was the rule, through brotherly 
ties, by members of the royal clan, or by affines of the ruler. 
Under the Mughals the system was replaced by a more rigidly 
hierarchical one. The previously loose arid shifting territorial divisions 
became clearly defined and named divisions (parganas) and sub-
divisions (tappas or patti). The local Rajas became mensabdars, with 
obligations to the Mughal state. The ruler himself became a jagir of the 
Mugha1s and, in turn, made jagir grants to nobles within his territory. 
Thus the system of bhai-bant was replaced by an internal hierarchical 
system within the Rajput client state which developed to meet the 
external military and financial obligations (Sharma I 977). 
Although the position of the ruler as a jagir of the Mughals changed 
after Mughal times, the main elements of the internal hierarchy survived. 
Essentially the system persisted until the land reforms of the 1950s. 
Except where specified, the following account refers to the position just 
prior to Independence. 
There were two broad types of land within the Rajput state: khalsa 
land was held for direct use by the ruler; all other land was given in 
grants to various types of intermediaries. In fact there were many types of 
grant with different rights and obligations. One important form, dating 
back to the recognition of bhomias by Rao Chunda, was Bhomichara 
tenure, under which the descendants of Raj puts who 'held the lands prior 
to the Rathore conquest of Marwar' (Upadhaya 1973: I 60) held tenure. 
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Apart from a small fee due to the ruler, bhomichara holders had no other 
obligations (Upadhaya 1973:161). 
There were other forms of tenure, based on different rights and 
obligations. These, however, need not concern us here. I will confine 
discussion to grants to jagirdars (otherwise known as Thakurs), since that 
was the dominant system in Marwar and was the system applying in 
Hinganiya. 
A jagirdar received a grant of a specific territory with an assessed 
annual income called rekh. Upadhaya separates the term rekh into three 
distinct aspects, although most authors use the single word, blurring the 
three aspects. Patta rekh was the assessed annual income specified in the 
grant deed. Actual income varied from year to year in practice. The 
jagirdar annually paid a tax called re kh bhartu which was a fixed 
proportion of the Patta rekh. Rajput jagirdars (there were some non-
Rajput Jagirdars) also had to provide a fixed number of troops in 
proportion to jagir income. This military rekh was called rekh chakri 
(Upadhaya 1973). In earlier times the rekh was assessed in terms of 
military obligation (the provision of a fixed number of horsemen or 
infantry), but later a lump sum was paid to the ruler in lieu of this, or in 
addition to it (Sharma 1977). There were other types of taxes and 
obligations which the jagirdars had to meet, but these are not important 
here. 
As an intermediary, the jagirdar then allocated land to various tenants 
who paid him rent from which he paid the rekh to the Maharajah, 
supporting himself and his supporters from this income and from the 
produce of land kept aside for his own private purposes. Land kept for the 
landowner's private purposes was farmed by hired or bonded labourers, 
members of the Thakur's own family, or by share farming tenants. It was 
also possible for the jagirdar to make jagir grants of land to others, 
usually close kinsmen and/or retainers. These people could themselves 
use the land for self-cultivation or rent it to tenants. While the position of 
jagirdar itself was passed on by primogeniture, the younger sons of a 
jagirdar received a small proportion of the jagir land for their upkeep 
(Upadhaya 1973). 
According to Upadhaya, jagir grants were effectively hereditary, 
although, when a jagirdar died his land technically became khalsa (i.e. 
under the direct control of the ruler) until the heir's claim was recognised. 
In fact inheritance by a direct lineal heir was refused only in very rare 
cases. 
The obligations placed on tenants were extensive. Besides rent, 
usually paid as a share in kind, there were a large number of other 
obligations. In Marwar, between fifty and one hundred and fifty different 
levies and taxes applied in different parts of the state in 1941 (Jodha 
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1985). They included grazing fees, levies on livestock and compulsory 
labour. 
It is not easy to describe any particular individual as the landowner, 
since everyone within the hierarchy held or used land within a complex 
network of rights and obligations. In one sense it would be appropriate to 
say that the land was vested in the State, in the person of the ruler. In 
Upadhaya's view it was actually considered to be vested in the ruling 
Rathor clan, of which the Maharajah was the first among equals 
(1973: 166). In practice, I suggest, the jagirdar can usefully be described 
as the 'landowner' since his rights were essentially hereditary and 
alienable at his discretion. Tenants might, in fact, use land passed on from 
generation to generation, but this was at the discretion of the jagir holder. 
Clearly, a major function of the jagir system was to provide for the 
needs of the rural nobility at the cost of tenants and labourers. However, 
it has also been argued that the jagir system was an ecologically effective 
land management system. Jodha, in a series of papers (1980, 1985, 1987), 
claims that land reforms in the 1950s led to a breakdown of controls on 
land use. This led to an increase in the cultivation of marginal land and 
livestock grazing on common land. Degradation of the quality of the land 
was a result. Jodha argues that, under the jagir system, access to grazing 
land was controlled by the landlord, who charged fees for grazing. 
Landlords also controlled cultivation, preventing cultivation of marginal 
land. After land reform these controls were lifted, with the result that 
marginal land was increasingly cultivated and livestock numbers 
increased. Jodha stresses that this management system emerged 'as a by-
product of [the] ... exploitative mechanism' (1987:203). 
As far as my field area is concerned, there is no evidence in favour of 
Jodha's thesis regarding increased use of marginal land after land reform. 
In Hinganiya, as I will show, land classified as cultivable did not increase 
from 1947 (before land reform) to 1986. However, Jodha' s case for an 
overall increase of cultivated land in western Rajasthan since land reform 
is convincing and there is no doubt that the proportion of cropland to all 
land has increased. In my view, however, the efficiency of the jagir 
system as a form of land management should not be overstated. There is 
an alternative view which blames desertification on the jagir system, 
rather than on its removal. Purohit (1978) argues that the demands of 
jagirdars on tenants led to overexploitation of land resources and that this 
was a major cause of desertification. 
(b) Land Reform 
During the 1950s land reform legislation was passed in many states of 
India. In Rajasthan a series of Acts, beginning with The Rajasthan Land 
Reform and Resumption of Jag irs Act 1955, and including the most 
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important Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955, abolished the position of 
intermediaries such as jagirdars and transferred effective ownership of 
land to the user. The user was given khctedhari rights, under which land 
could only be taken from the cultivator by the state. Those with 
khatedhari rights no longer had to pay rent to the former landlords. The 
previous landlords themselves maintained a right to khudkusht land (that 
is, land used for personal cultivation, including land cultivated by hired 
labourers, but not by tenants). There were, however, limits placed on the 
amount of khudkusht land which could be claimed. A number of other 
features of the package of land reform legislation were: 
• There was an overall land ceiling, to be gazetted for each district or 
sub-district. The ceiling applied to a household of five members. 
Larger households were entitled to exceed the limit. 
• Land in excess of the land ceiling was to be transferred to poorer 
farmers. Members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were to 
receive preference. 
• Once land was held by a person from a scheduled caste or tribe it 
could not be sold to anyone not also from a scheduled caste or 
scheduled tribe (depending on which category the seller himself 
came from). 
• Land could only be leased for a maximum of five years. There 
were some exceptions here: land owned by minors, students, 
widows, mentally or physically disabled people, military 
servicemen and people in a small number of other categories, could 
be leased for a longer period. 
• A land tax was to be paid to the state based on the area of land and 
its assessed quality. There were provisions for suspension of tax 
liabilities at times of natural disaster (such as drought). The amount 
of liability was, and still is, actually quite nominal. For example, in 
1986 the tax for the best quality of unirrigated land was Rs 0.47 per 
bigha (about three rupees per hectare) per year. 
The main legal effect of the land reform legislation was to transfer the 
'fruits of the land to the cultivator' (as it was put to me by the Sub-
Divisional Officer responsible for Hinganiya). Subject to limitations on 
the amount of land which could be owned and the restriction on selling 
land outside the categories Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, the user 
of land had rights of hereditary ownership and the right to alienate the 
land. The previous tenant effectively became the owner. 
It is significant that rights to land were conceived in terms of enjoying 
the products of the land. This way of looking at things persists from the 
period before land reform up to the present. In the 1947 village settlement 
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papers for Hinganiya, the land register refers to the bhokta and the up-
bhokta for each piece of land. The word bhokta means literally 'one who 
enjoys'. The terms thus mean, respectively, the one who enjoys the fruits 
of the land and the subordinate enjoyer (up-bhokta means sub-bhokta or 
vice-bhokta). The terms can be glossed as landholder and tenant, 
respectively, in reference to the period before land reform. After land 
reform their referents shifted. The bhokta is now the state (the bhokta 
column actually being left blank in the register) and the up-bhokta is now 
the landowner. 
(c) The Effectiveness of Land Reform 
The India-wide movement towards land reform following 
Independence can be seen as the result of a philosophical commitment by 
the Congress Party, particularly of Jawarharlal Nehru (Harcourt 1986). It 
is worth examining briefly the practical effects of land reform legislation. 
It is something of a commonplace observation of land refo~m in India 
generally that the people who most profited were the previous tenant 
classes. Large owners lost land, and, more critically, the income from 
land previously farmed by tenants. The landless remained l~ndless, or 
gained comparatively little (see, for example, Kamal 1984). In the case of 
Rajasthan, it is clear that major changes took place, but the extent to 
which they might be described as revolutionary is questionable. 
Sharma (1970), in a comparative study of six villages in eastern 
Rajasthan, found that there had been no significant change in the class 
structure, despite tht: abolition of the zamindary (another type of tenure) 
and jagir systems. There had been some new developments. For example, 
the higher classes mobilised other resources in the post reform period (for 
example, in money lending), but the basic structure remained essentially 
unchanged. 
Kamal (1984) cites evidence that 2.91% of rural families in Rajasthan 
remain landless while 9.84% possess as little as one half of an acre of 
land (0.02 ha). The top 3.33% of families own 24.34% of the total land, 
with more than 50 acres (20 ha) each family. The bottom 46.83% own 
five or less acres (2 ha) and less than 9% of the total land. While I am 
very doubtful about the precision of such figures, based on my own 
experiences in trying to obtain similar data for a very small area, even the 
general order of magnitude demonstrates that the distribution of land 
ownership remains desperately skewed, despite land reform. 
Kamal attributes the inadequacies of the reforms to the fact that the 
Congress Party, once it ceased to be a nationalist movement and became 
a political party, was forced to include the former feudal elite in its fold. 
Thus the State Government lacks political will in enforcing land reform. I 
think that this somewhat distorts the process of land reform. It emphasises 
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the role of those who had most to lose in blocking effective land reform, 
but ignores the interests of the tenant classes who gained most. Land 
reform legislation was explicitly concerned with transferring land to the 
people who were cultivating it, that is, the tenant farmers. Attempts to 
distribute land to the landless were a somewhat secondary concern. The 
lack of political will in enforcing land reform is, I suggest, not so much a 
result of the incorporation of the feudal elite into the Congress Party, but 
the result of the fact that the leaders of movements towards agrarian 
reform (the former tenant classes, particularly the Jats) have got what 
they want. 
Rosin reports on an analysis of reform in various parts of Rajasthan. 
His findings support 
... the general success of the initial Rajasthan land-reform program 
in removing intermediaries and eventually giving title to land to 
those who cultivate it, whether previous tenants or resident 
landlords. (1981:76) 
Rosin's study suggests 'that absentee landlords were more readily 
divested of their estates' than resident landlords (p.76). 
To me the crucial issue is the notion that the original tenants largely 
gained from land reform (Rosin talks about some ways in which its 
purposes were side-stepped), but the pre-Reform landless seem to be left 
out of the equation. I think there is a problem in the way Rosin attempts 
to measure the success of land reform. 
He identifies two indices for measuring its effectiveness. Both indices 
are conceived of as statistical tools for comparing different regions. One 
is the 'percentage of cultivators who had not previously been landlords 
[now] holding proprietary rights' (p.75). The other index is the extent of 
subleasing. The significance of this second index is rather ambiguous in 
my view. A high rate of subleasing could be as much an indicator of the 
failure of land reform as of its success. I therefore intend to leave it out of 
the discussion. 
But what of the other index, Rosin's percentage of cultivators holding 
proprietorial rights? It is, in practice, rather difficult to express changes in 
the numbers of people holding proprietorial rights as a percentage. In 
fact, I am a little uncertain as to what is supposed to be a percentage of 
what. If we are talking in terms of the percentages of pre-reform 
households which held proprietorial rights in comparison to the number 
of post-reform households which hold proprietorial rights, we would need 
to know the actual number of households at some specific time 
immediately prior to reform. The records, for Hinganiya at least, do not 
tell us that. They only say which individuals held property rights and 
which individuals were tenants. Brothers can own land individually in 
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terms of the register, but whether they are members of a combined 
household is not shown. The records don't mention landless households 
and they don't help us to distinguish between individual tenant 
households and clusters of tenant households. 
I prefer to talk about the transfer of proprietorial rights as an indicator 
rather than as an index and to look at whatever evidence is available to 
see whether it does suggest a transfer of proprietorial rights. Have the 
descendants of the old landholding class avoided land ceilings? 
There is a more fundamental problem. Emphasis on proprietorial 
rights obscures the key issue: to what extent have more people gained 
access to land since land reform? 
I suggest that the most useful indicator of the success of land reform is 
the pattern of land distribution among rural households. Thus, in terms of 
the transfer of proprietorial rights, land reform has been largely (although 
to different extents in various parts of Rajasthan) successful. However, in 
terms of the actual distribution of land amongst households it has not 
been particularly successful, as Kamal shows. 
An increase in the spread of proprietorial rights is not, in itself, a 
trivial thing. I do not wish to imply that a change in status from a tenant 
paying substantial rent (perhaps as much as a half share)I to that of an 
owner paying only token land tax to the government is not a major 
change. However it is the extent of distribution of land accompanying the 
new status that completes the process of revolution. In discussing the 
figures for Hinganiya, I will be examining the extent of changes in the 
social structure since 1947 in terms of both criteria. 
The Institution of Household and Inheritance of Land 
As a pre-requisite to understanding land ownership an essential 
starting point is the concept of household. I would like to digress briefly 
to describe the main attributes of the concept of household and the related 
concept of household cluster. Both terms are useful glosses for 
indigenous terms, not mere anthropologist's abstractions. 
The term ghar (literally 'house') is used to describe the basic domestic 
and economic unit in western Rajasthan. A household may be a simple 
nuclear family, a patrilineal extended family (comprising the household 
head, his wife, married sons and various wives and children) or some 
other form of composite household (such as a household head, his nuclear 
family, and an un-married brother or sister). 
1 Just prior to land reform, tenants of the Kur Jagirdar paid one third of all crops to 
the landlord. He, in tum, paid Rs 150 per year to the Maharajah as tax. 
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Essentially the household is a domestic unit, although some 
individuals are effectively part-time members, since they are frequently, 
even usually, resident elsewhere because of career or employment 
requirements. The most obvious indicator of household membership is 
that members share food cooked from a common heath when they are 
together. The Census of India bases its definition of household on eating 
together (Census oflndia 1981 b). 
The economic focus of the household is primarily obvious in terms of 
shared consumption. The household boundaries do not necessarily limit 
cooperation. Even though extended families might be broken up into 
separate households in a formal sense (with all parties asserting this 
separateness), a great deal of cooperation (such as sharing herding or 
farming tasks) occurs between households, particularly those related 
through a proximate common ancestor, living or dead. A cluster of 
related households, approximating a minimal lineage, is simply described 
as ek parivar, which can be translated literally as 'one family'. I translate 
ghar as 'household' and use the term 'household cluster' for ek parivar. 
Theoretically, all income earned by members of a household should be 
given to the household head to control and distribute. In practice, this 
does not always occur, particularly when some members of a household 
are resident elsewhere and have separate expenses and separate income 
from wages or salary. However, even in these cases, much of the income 
is used for household purposes.2 
The pooling of resources is perhaps the most essential characteristic of 
a household (Neil Maclean, pers. comm.). One way in which members of 
a household resident elsewhere contribute is by purchasing goods 
(including foodstuffs) for which they are not reimbursed. When goods are 
purchased on behalf of others outside the household, even from closely 
related households, the buyer is usually reimbursed. 
The relationship between the household and land holding is crucial, 
but highly complex. Where the household holds land the household head 
(usually a male) is responsible for its management. This does not mean 
that he is the owner of the land, since he may merely hold it in trust for 
other members of the household. This may occur either because the 
owner is relatively young or, sometimes because the owner is frequently 
absent, perhaps on military service. I must stress that in this context I am 
referring to land ownership in terms of rights recognised by the parties. 
These rights usually conform to the rights which would apply under the 
2 As Hill (1984) points out, in reference to the concept of household in many 
agricultural societies, the degree of economic individualism in a household may 
be such that the household head can become a very unreliable source of data, 
simply because there is much about the economic affairs of the household that he 
doesn't know. 
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Hindu Succession Act 1956 (at least as far as males are concerned), but do 
not necessarily do so. 
Land is often legally registered in the household head's name, but this 
is not always the case. Sometimes, particularly in a joint household, land 
may be registered in the name of another member or more than one other 
member. While the household remains together, land can be regarded as 
the property of the household. Nevertheless certain individuals are 
regarded as having an entitlement to specific shares and land is 
partitioned on the basis of those shares when new households are formed. 
The household head effectively holds land, whether legally registered in 
his name or not, in trust according to legally and/or traditionally defined 
shares. 
Land, is inherited in the male line, being shared equally by sons.3 
(Customarily, a father's house is inherited by his youngest son.) Land is 
vested in an individual, not in a household. The household, while it is not 
the landowning unit, is the land-using unit. The production from the lands 
owned by a member of a particular household is used for the household 
as a whole as long as that person remains a member of the household. 
While the household can be conceived of as a unit which uses iand 
jointly, there are some intermediate forms which confuse the relationship 
between housholds and land. 
One intermediate form occurs in the situation in which land is held by 
a household head, but some sons (or siblings) own separate livestock and 
operate as independent households in other respects. This can happen 
when the head of the non-landholding household is normally absent from 
the village (on military service or working in Jodhpur) while his wife and 
children remain in the village and operate as a separate household. Land 
which will ultimately be partitioned may be held in trust by a resident 
father or brother. It is also possible for land to be held by a senior, despite 
the existence of otherwise separate households, in order to prevent or 
delay the sub-division of land into very small holdings. 
. The household may be intermediate in a chronological sense as well as 
a structural one. On one occasion I was interviewing one of two brothers. 
He said that there were two separate households, yet the other brother 
held all the land. At that time I was accompanied by an informant who 
explained that they were 'just going separate'. The brother who had no 
land had recently retired from the army. 
The existence of separate households is normally quite clear-cut, being 
based on self-identification. However there are some ambiguous cases. 
Under the Hindu Succession Act 1956 the property of an intestato.: household head 
is divided equally amongst his wife, sons and daughters. The shares of female 
offspring are generally ignored, in practice, at least as far land is concerned. 
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People outside a particular household cluster sometimes assert very 
confidently that a particular group comprises a single household in cases 
where the parties themselves assert that there are two or more separate 
households. On one occasion my statement that 'X says that he andY are 
heads of separate households andY says so too', was simply dismissed 
by a third party who insisted that they belonged to a single household. 
This is hardly surprising, given that household membership is largely a 
matter of self-definition. However, there are two cases in which there 
seems to have been some genuine ambiguity about household 
membership because people made differing assertions about their 
relationships to each other. 
In one case, involving two Meghwal brothers, the elder brother said 
there was one household, while the other claimed that they were separate. 
This occured during my 1983-84 fieldwork. By 1985 the households were 
unambigously separate. I interpret this as another case of 'just going 
separate'. Each of the parties had different views about the status of the 
intermediate form and about the exact point at which separation was 
complete. One regarded the transfer of land as the conclusive issue, the 
other did not. It is also possible that there may have been some conflict 
about the process of separation. 
For present purposes, the important point about the household is that 
one of its main functions is the control of land, although control of land 
does not define the household. Similarly, the process of household 
formation is related to the inheritance of land, although the inheritance of 
land is not a necessary pre-requisite for household formation. Land and 
property can be divided between sons while a father is still alive 
(depending on the agreement of the parties concerned) or after his death. 
Sometimes one brother (often, but not necessarily, the elder) becomes 
household head and holds land in trust for younger brothers, or for those 
doing military service. It is quite possible for other brothers to head their 
own otherwise separate households while land remains in trust. This 
would normally occur when they are 'part-time residents' (see Chapter 9) 
or frequent absentees from the village. It is common for the shares of 
some siblings to be held in trust while the shares of others are distributed 
(partitioned). 
As will become clearer later, reference to holding in trust relates to 
effective control of a share, not necessarily to legal registered ownership. 
Under local practice, land originally owned by a father will be divided 
equally among his sons. Wives can hold land in trust, but in practice 
widows usually transfer responsibility to the eldest son, or adopt a son if 
there is no natural son. If sons are very young, temporary absorption of 
the household into the household of a relative of the deceased father may 
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occur. The three cases in Hinganiya of households headed by women are 
rare examples. 
Two of these simply relate to a situation in which a male household 
head has died , leaving sons, but the widow has held land in trust rather 
than choosing to have her household absorbed into another. One case is 
that of one of the four households of the Soda clan, which is headed by 
the widow of the previous household head. The household consists of the 
woman and one young son. Her name appears on the village land register 
as a landowner. The other case is a Bishnoi woman with four adult sons 
and a younger daughter. 
In these two cases the role of the mother as household head is not 
necessarily a deviation from the normal practice of dividing land only 
among male offspring, since the function of the arrangement is to hold 
the land in trust until the sons come of age. 
The other case, an all female Bishnoi household, was derived from 
unusual circumstances. The woman's husband died in 1983. As their only 
son had been murdered some time before, no male descendant was 
available. Normally the household would have become assimilated into 
the household of a near male relative of the husband, or the wife would 
have adopted a young male kinsman (usually a son of the deceased man's 
brother) to inherit both the property and position of the deceased 
household head. In this case the woman refused to nominate a successor 
because of the tensions which existed over the death of her son, who had 
been murdered by a young kinsman of her husband. 
In 1983 a Rajput informant told me that he thought the woman would 
probably sell her land, because she would not choose someone to take 
over. This informant assumed that she would either have to select 
someone or sell the land. He apparently did not regard permanent 
leadership of a household by a woman as conceivable. 
In 1985 the household continued to exist as an all female household, 
consisting of the woman, a married daughter and three young girls (one 
of the household head's own daughters and two daughters of her married 
daughter. The married daughter continued to live separately from her 
husband, who lived in another village. 
The appearance of women's names on the 1947 land register for 
Hinganiya suggests the possibility of women heading households even 
before the period of modem law, but this is uncertain and, even if it were 
so, such cases appear to have been just as rare then as they are now. The 
reasons for women heading households were probably similar to the first 
two contemporary cases mentioned above. 
Despite the local practice of distributing land equally among sons 
there are several ways in which unequal holdings between male siblings 
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may develop. Firstly, new land acquired during a period of trusteeship is 
regarded as the property of the household head. It can be retained and 
divided at his discretion. 
Another source of potential discrepancy is the institution of khola 
(adoption). When a household head dies without male offspring the 
widow may adopt a younger male kinsman (normally a brother's son of 
the deceased household head) as khola bacca (adopted son). Adoption 
can also be arranged during a landholder's lifetime, if he has no natural 
heirs. The khola bacca inherits land and the position of household head. 
He is not normally eligible to inherit land from his genitor as well as his 
adopted father, although there are one or two cases in the land records 
where this appears to have happened. I am unable to explain these 
exceptions. 
There is one other way in which unequal holdings among male 
siblings may originate, although this relates solely to the descendants of 
the jagirdars. Under the jagir system inheritance of jagir land was by 
primogeniture. As some of the old Thakurs (a more common local term 
for jagirdar) are still alive, unequal land holdings between ex-Thakurs 
and their siblings are often evident. 
Although the jagir system has ceased to exist legally, the title Thakur 
(or Thakur-sahab) is still inherited by the process of primogeniture and 
those who hold the title still attract considerable prestige.4 English 
speaking Thakurs often describe themselves as 'ex-Thakur', just as the 
Maharajah is described as 'ex-Maharajah'. The 'ex' does not imply that 
the holder of the title has personally retained it from the pre-reform 
period. He may have succeeded long after the legal abolition of the 
position of Thakur (or Maharajah). The 'ex' seems to have become an 
intrinsic part of the title, as it is used in English. (The English prefix 'ex' 
is also used in the vernacular.) 
The current Thakur of Hinganiya inherited his title only a few years 
ago. His predescessor was a paternal uncle who died childless and passed 
on his role and his remaining hmd (this all happened after land reform) to 
the current Thakur as khola bacca. The previous Thakur's brother 
(genitor of the present ex-Thakur) is still alive. Due to the fact that the 
current ex-Thakur is himself very ill and rarely leaves his house, the 
brother of the former Thakur is himself often called Thakur-Sahab, as if 
this fills a gap among the roles available in the prestige hierarchy. This 
case, of what seems to me to be very loose usage, probably would not 
have been possible if the position had any legal authority. 
4 The rule of primogeniture was explicitly intended as a means of protecting 
Thakurs from assassination by siblings. It also minimised partition of land. 
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Land Ownership Today: Interpreting the Register 
The analysis of land ownership in Hinganiya later in this chapter is 
based on data obtained from the register of landholdings kept by the 
Patwari (the land registration officer, who is ultimately resposible to the 
District Collector in Jodhpur). In 1985-86 the Patwari for Hinganiya was 
stationed in Kur and was responsible for the three villages in the 
Panchayat. A separate register was maintained for each village. 
Administratively speaking a village is the smallest area for which 
separate land records are kept. I was able, with the assistance of the 
Patwari, to abstract details from the register for Hinganiya. I also 
examined and copied extracts from the 1947 settlement records kept in 
Jodhpur. 
The basic land register is in the form of a set of columns. The first 
column is a tax account number, but it acts simply as a serial number. 
The second column is the bhokta. In the 1947 Land Settlement records 
the bhokta was either one or both of the Jagirdars, or a close relative of 
the Jagirdars. In 1985 it was left blank, the government being regarded as 
the bhokta. The third column identifies the up-bhokta (the sub-bhokta). 
Effectively this refers to the tenant of the J agirdars in 1947 and to the 
land holder in 1985.5 Following this are listed the plot numbers of fields 
held within the account, the area of each plot and the category and quality 
of land. The categories of land refer to the assessed quality of land in the 
case of farming land, or to any other purpose for which it is used: road, 
wells, cremation ground, abadi (village residential area) or dhani 
(dispersed residential hamlets). The classification of land is based on a 
dichotomy between irrigated and unirrigated land. Within each of these 
categories there are a number of grades. Land tax varies according to the 
grade. All agricultural land in Hinganiya is unirrigated (barani). The four 
grades are BA (tax Rs 0.47 per bigha), B I (Rs 0.32 per bigha), B2 (Rs 
0.25 per bigha) and B3 (Rs 0.15 per bigha). While this amount is referred 
to as a tax, it is entirely nominal and should probably be regarded as a 
registration fee. Nevertheless, during declared famine it is not collected. 
IR 1985 there were ninety-four account numbers and 355 numbered 
fields. 
While the register is the official record of landholdings there are 
substantial difficulties in using it to compile breakdowns of individual 
holdings or holdings by household. I shall discuss these difficulties in 
some length here because assessing the reliability and usefulness of my 
data on landholding depends on an understanding of these points. 
5 While theoretically the state owns all land it is convenient to gloss the term up-
bhokta as land owner because the up-bhokta can alienate the land or pass it on to 
his descendants. 
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For each account a number of blocks of land are listed and the 
individual or individuals who hold this land are identified. An individual 
may appear in several accounts, since he may have joint shares with 
different combinations of partners. Often, the land is held by a number of 
people (sometimes ten or eleven) on a share basis. The problem is that the 
size of the shares is not always clear. Where several names (usually of 
brothers) are listed without a share being defined it is possible that the 
division of shares is not equal, but it is reasonable to assume that it is 
equal in most cases. In some cases shares are made quite explicit: for 
example the entry may read 'so-and-so one third share and so-and-so two 
thirds'. The most complicated cases combine the two types of entry. For 
example three brothers are identified as holding a one~third share between 
them, but no details are given as to their individual shares. Another set of 
four brothers shares the other two-thirds share. Thus, assuming equal sub-
sharing between owners of fixed shares, we have a case where three 
people each own one ninth of the land nominated and four others each 
own one sixth. The land in question may be in several dispersed blocks of 
unequal size. It may also be extremely small, as plots are often less than 
one hectare in area. If one of the nominated share holders is deceased 
then the sub-division of his one ninth share becomes very complex. In the 
case of the 1947 Settlement Records the situation is further complicated 
by the fact that the same sort of sharing of rights to land can relate to both 
the bhokta and the up-bhokta. In other words a number of people are joint 
owners and several other people are, jointly, tenants. 
In the case of jointly owned plots of land, the plots are not normally 
farmed cooperatively, unless shareholders are members of the same 
household. Rather, some sort of sub-division of plots is made between the 
people involved. The land register does not operate at this level of detail. 
An underlying problem is that the record itself, despite the efforts of 
the Patwari, is not always completely up-to-date. Sales of land appear to 
be updated promptly, but changes of land ownership following a death 
are often not recorded. The register lists several deceased people as 
landholders or holders of shares in land. Reluctance to get too involved in 
the paperwork of re-registering land may be a factor in this. When a plot, 
or several plots, are identified as the property of a single deceased owner, 
the current situation can be fairly easily calculated on the basis of known 
modes of inheritance. However, when the deceased person held the land 
jointly with a number of others (in sometimes unequal and sometimes 
unspecified shares), it can be exceedingly difficult to calculate the sub-
shares of heirs. 
There is not always a co-incidence between de jure (legally registered) 
and de facto ownership of land. 
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• Sometimes land is legally transferred by a father to his sons (or to 
some of them) before his death. This, presumably, is done to avoid 
complications later. The father may continue de facto to manage 
some of the land himself, while remaining nominally landless. 
• It is quite common for people who do not legally own land (i.e. 
land is not registered in their names) to be landholders in fact. 
Partition of land between brothers may have taken place, but 
because a transfer hasn't been recorded one brother appears as the 
legal owner. 
• People who are registered as legal landholders (including small 
children) may be members of another household (father's, 
brother's or father's brother's). Land is de facto held by the 
household head in trust. 
From the point of view of compiling data on de facto landholdings the 
issue is quite complex. It is necessary to use the land register and then to 
make certain assumptions about the actual divisions of land owned by 
individual household heads. The inheritance practices are the basis for 
making these assumptions and knowledge of genealogical relationships 
and household status (derived from a full census of the village) are 
essential. 
The principles I have used in analysing the records from Hinganiya 
are as follows: 
• Where the register names an individual as landholder or as holding 
a defined share, I have simply recorded that share against his or her 
name, unless 
- he or she is deceased, in which case land is equally apportioned 
among living male descendants; 
- he or she is not recognised as a household head, in which case the 
land is recorded against the name of the household head. 
• Where the equal share inheritance rule is used, but some heirs are 
still members of another household, the share is included as part of 
the ownership of that household. (For example, three brothers may 
be entitled to equal shares, with the second brother having 
separated from the eldest brother and the youngest still living with 
the eldest. In this situation the household of the middle brother is 
assessed as having one share whereas the eldest brother's 
household has two.) 
• Where two or more names are listed as sharing land, but the details 
of the shares are not defined, I assume it is an equal share. 
Similarly where a specified share is further sub-divided among two 
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or more individuals without details of the sub-share, I assume that 
the sub-division is equal. 
• Where my own local knowledge suggests that these conclusions do 
not apply, I have made adjustments accordingly. 
In summary, the analysis gives priority to recorded de jure ownership, 
modified according to inheritance rules and my own knowledge of de 
facto variations. 
An obvious objection to the priority given to legally registered 
landholdings is that a thorough survey of households for de facto 
holdings would have been more useful. That might be true in theory, but, 
in fact, such data is very hard to obtain for a number of reasons, not least 
of which is the fact that many people are reluctant to say how much land 
they own and may distort figures for one reason or another. Another 
reason is that concepts of area are very vague. People tend to think of 
landholdings in terms of location of plots rather than in terms of gross 
area. The register records land in hectares and bighas, but these terms are 
not used by many villagers. There is a local measurement (halki) which is 
perhaps better known. Attempts to obtain data on landholdings through a 
semi-structured survey in 1983 provided me with data which I regard to 
be completely unreliable. Approaching the question of land ownership 
through official records seems to be the only viable approach, whatever 
its limitations. 
Despite the use of these principles there are some cases where 
ambiguities exist and other cases where obvious irregularities occur. 
However, I maintain that the overall exercise is fairly accurate. Firstly, 
ownership by caste is completely accurate, as there are no cases where 
land is shared by members of two or more castes. Secondly, because of 
the accuracy of caste totals, averages per head of population and averages 
per household within castes are accurate. Thirdly, the larger landholders 
tend to own land individually and in easily assessible shares. It is mainly 
in the case of middle and smaller landholders that complex sharing of 
holdings exists. The ambiguities thus affect relative ranking of individual 
households, not gross categorisation as larger, middle size and small 
landholders. Fourthly, almost all irregularities or ambiguities relate to the 
breakdown of shares within a cluster of related households (that is, 
households whose heads are descended from a single proximate 
ancestor). While this last factor makes it tempting to give all households 
within a household cluster equal shares, this would ignore such factors as 
unequal inheritance through adoption, purchase of new land and so on. 
The most likely source of error in the figures is in the case of 
households which are in the transitional stage of breaking away from 
another household, or where households are separate but, because the 
household head is a part time resident, land has not yet been transferred. 
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In the absence of specific evidence that land has been legally or de facto 
allocated to them, they are treated as having no land. A related situation is 
that of a landless Bishnoi who has legally transferred all land to his sons 
and is now nominally landless. The sons are heads of separate 
households, although the household cluster operates fairly cooperatively. 
The landless household category is, thus, something of a false category as 
it essentially comprises people who would normally own land. 
I have focused on landholdings per household rather than on 
landholdings per household cluster despite the fact that more reliable 
figures could be calculated for household clusters. I have done this 
because the household is fundamentally more important as a focus of 
economic activity. The household cluster is simply not a corporate unit, 
especially in terms of landholding, despite the fact that members often 
work cooperatively together and sometimes hold land in trust for other 
members. To analyse landholdings on the basis of household clusters 
would be to impose a function on to a social category to which it has no 
relevance. Further, as household clusters are immensely variable in size 
and composition, the resulting figures would be of little value for 
comparing economic status. 
The analysis of Hinganiya landholdings which follows needs to be 
qualified in one other respect. I have based my figures on an analysis of 
the land records for Hinganiya. A significant amount of land within the 
administrative boundaries of the village is held by people who are not 
resident. Some of these people are 'part-time residents'. A person is a 
part-time resident if he is a member of a household which is normally 
resident in the village, but spends most of his time living and working 
elsewhere. (The category is explained more fully in Chapter 9.) This is 
quite different from people who have economic interests in the village 
(including land ownership) but who are members of and live with a 
household resident elsewhere. I call these people absentees. Absentees 
who have landholdings in Hinganiya include close relatives (siblings or 
sons) of householders presently resident in Hinganiya. Others are resident 
in nearby villages. 
The main difficulty with all of this is that, given the considerable 
share of village land held by non-residents, it is clear that residents may 
also hold land outside of Hinganiya. In fact I am explicitly aware of only 
a single Rajput who does own land elsewhere and he was rather 
confidential and secretive about it. I simply do not have any other data on 
outside landholdings. In order to find other landholdings held by people 
from Hinganiya it would be necessary to examine the records from all 
villages. Obviously this is impossible. The only way that the Patwari can 
assure that an individual's holdings in other villages do not cumulatively 
exceed the land ceiling is by liaison with other Patwaris. There is 
considerable margin of error in this, and consequently there is some 
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potential for cheating on the land ceiling laws. This fact, plus the fact that 
all 'absentee' landholders who hold land in Hinganiya are from higher 
castes, tends to suggest that absentee land-ownership is more likely with 
larger landholders. The distortion is in the direction of under reporting of 
larger holdings. 
Class Models of Rural Peasant Societies 
The working hypothesis in my analysis of landholdings is that there is 
a close nexus between land and wealth. Thus, I will initially be treating 
economic status as purely an outcome of the size of a household's 
landholding. I am, of course, aware from the beginning that this is not the 
case. In fact, even if the quality of land is fairly constant, factors such as 
household size and alternative income are important factors in economic 
status. Nevertheless, the size of landholdings makes a useful starting 
point for discussion. My purpose in approaching the data from the point 
of view of the land-wealth nexus is to identify the points at which the 
nexus breaks down. 
I must stress that I am concerned with variations of economic status 
within the peasant sector of the society of western Rajasthan, not with the 
broader class structures. While it might be argued that 'class' ought to be 
used only for categories of people who are identifiable by fundamentally 
different relationships with the means of production, I believe it is useful 
to use the term as a gloss for sub-categories within the broader category 
'peasant'. I use the term class in this way because my aim is not to 
discuss the subtleties of class theory, but to examine sub-categories of 
peasant farmers which identify qualitatively different levels of economic 
self-sufficiency or dependence. 
Before examining the land-wealth nexus in Hinganiya, I will, in this 
section, establish a typology of economic strata within which households 
can be ranked. This presents some preliminary theoretical and practical 
problems. 
Agrarian households can be ranked using a variety of different 
principles of ranking. It is possible to plot households hierarchically using 
various single factor criteria such as size of landholding or average 
annual ca~h income. Alternatively it is possible to use multi-dimensional 
criteria, such as a formula which takes account of landholding, 
agricultural production, non-farm income and the number of consumers 
in the household. However, continuous scales produced by numerical 
ranking alone are of limited value for analysis. Some method of 
classification is needed to define categories of households into classes 
with some basic economic characteristics in common. Simply breaking 
numerical rankings into deciles or quartiles or other numerically defined 
ranges is not particularly helpful unless the ranges coincide with some 
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sort of qualitative differences. This is not to say that the qualitative 
characteristics need to have fixed boundaries coinciding with the 
numerical ones, but at least the characteristics need to form a cluster 
approximately related to the range. 
Thus, there are two problems: (1) on what numerical criteria can 
households be ranked? and (2) what method can best be used to group 
ranked households into economically distinct and meaningful categories? 
Athreya et al. (1986), in an analysis of a rural class system in southern 
India, adopt a 'surplus criterion of class'. Depending on complex 
calculations of surplus production, particular farms are placed on a 
continuous scale. A number of points on the scale are treated as modal 
points roughly identifying particular 'reproductive levels'. The 
'reproductive levels' coincide with differing capacities of the income of a 
farm to enable the farm to reproduce itself and the household without 
non-farm income. The first reproductive level comprised poor peasants 
'whose farms do not yield enough to provide the household even with its 
grain requirement' (p. 4). The second and third levels, comprising lower 
middle and middle peasants, are able to meet household grain 
requirements, but require non-farm income to meet 'cash costs for 
production' and 'the needs for non-grain consumption'. Reproductive 
level four comprises the 'notional middle peasant' whose farm is 'a fully 
reproductive farm where non-farm sources of income are not necessary 
for the reproduction of the family and the farm' (p. 4). Reproductive level 
five includes the 'surplus appropriators' who may be of several types: 
'rich peasants, capitalist farmers, big capitalist farmers, cultivating 
landlords, and pure landlords' (p. 4). 
A merit of this approach is that the 'classes' are defined in terms of 
various levels of farm self-sufficiency. The qualitative characteristics 
suggest economically significant categories. Before they can be used, 
however, there is a major problem to be resolved: the whole approach 
depends too much on a very complex formula for defining where a farm 
(or household) fits on the continuous scale. 
The formula for defining the surplus requires data in order to establish 
variables on 'gross income from marketing of farm produce', 'grain 
requirement of the household', 'cash costs for production', 'cash required 
to meet non-grain consumption needs', 'wage equivalent of family labour 
days' etc. I am very suspicious of attempts to obtain good data for any of 
these variables. Data could be obtained either by watching a very small 
number of households for a full annual cycle or through very detailed 
interview data for each household. The first approach might provide 
accurate data for the households actually observed, but would not help for 
other households (and would not help where conditions varied drastically 
from year to year). The second approach makes all sorts of assumptions 
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about the cooperativeness of household heads, their detailed knowledge 
of all facets of the economic affairs of the household, their ability to 
quantify inputs and outputs and, unless interviews are very regular, their 
ability to remember inputs and outputs over a period of time. As Hill 
(1984) shows, none of these assumptions can easily be made and data 
based on such assumptions are likely to be very dubious. Even if 
satisfactory data could be collected in a given year, the problems of using 
this sort of formula would be multiplied in an environment where 
'normal' conditions rarely apply. 
My view is that complex formulae based on dubious data are unlikely 
to produce anything more useful than classification made on the basis of 
relatively simple criteria. However, even if this is accepted there are 
alternative approaches each with strong arguments for and against their 
adoption. Ranking in terms of the single criterion of land ownership per 
household has seductive appeal due to its very simplicity. However, 
where farm production is directed at subsistence as a first priority and 
surplus is a secondary concern, there is some argument for including 
some allowance for the subsistence requirements of particular 
households. This can be done either by simply dividing land area by the 
number of people in a household or by dividing landholding by the 
number of consumption units (a measure which provides a differential 
weighting for adults and children). Ranking would thus be in terms of 
land available per person or per consumption unit. 
There are problems involved in rankings which take account of 
subsistence requirements. Firstly, the subsistence requirements of a 
particular household vary over time as people are born, grow older, marry 
outside the household and die. Ranking households to take account of 
such factors produces rather ephemeral results: people go up and down 
the 'class system' according to the part of the household development 
cycle they have reached. If people can move in and out of particular 
classes so easily, we have moved away from a concept of a class as a 
ranked status group whose members tend to pass on their status to their 
descendants. A class is usually thought of as a ranked status group which 
tends to reproduce itself. 
There is another problem with a ranking which takes account of 
household size. One relationship which I wish to examine is the 
relationship between landholding and household size. If this relationship 
is to be tested then the two variables need to be kept separate. 
This leaves us with something of a dilemma. On the one hand simple 
ranking in terms of the size of landholding alone, tends to obscure 
variations in the self-sufficiency of the farming unit due to differing 
subsistence requirements. On the other hand including some measure of 
variable subsistence requirements tends to overemphasise the ephemeral 
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changes of economic status due to the life cycle stages of particular 
households. 
It seems. to me that the latter is perhaps a larger problem. I will 
pmceed with an analysis of rankings based on landholdings alone. This 
brings me back to the second problem of ranking: what method can best 
be used to group ranked households into economically distinct and 
meaningful categories? 
I have pointed out that the numerical formula used by Athreya et al. is 
so complex as to be of dubious value as a basis for ranking. However, the 
characteristics of the various reproductive levels indicate substantive 
differences in what the authors describe as the differing capacities of the 
farm to reproduce itself and the household without non-farm income. 
These reproductive levels are perhaps better described as levels of self-
sufficiency. 
I propose a slightly simplified series of agricultural classes for 
Hinganiya and the surrounding villages, based on a similar model. The 
system does not take account of non-farm income, or of income from 
pastoralism, being based purely on land ownership. 
The categories are as follows: 
Category 1: 
Very poor peasant owning less than two hectares of land. As explained 
below two hectares is a threshold below which grain production will be 
inadequate for an average household's consumption even in a good year. 
Peasants in this category are heavily dependent on non-farm income. 
(Non-farm income refers to income earned otherwise than from the 
household's own land.) 
Category 2 
Poor peasant owning two or more but less than five hectares. 
Households in this category will be self-sufficient in grain for household 
consumption in a good year, but would not to be able to meet 
consumption needs in a poor year. Households would be substantially 
dependent on non-farm income. 
Category 3 
Lower middle peasant owning five or more but less than ten hectares. 
Households in this category would produce enough grain to meet 
household consumption needs under most circumstances. Surplus grain 
produced in good years allows the household to survive in most poorer 
years. Farm income needs to be supplemented by paid labour to obtain 
cash for non-grain needs and to enable needs to be met in a bad sequence 
of years. 
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Category 4 
Middle peasant owning at least ten but less than twenty hectares. 
Households in this Category produce enough income from agriculture to 
meet all normal household requirements even in poor years and can be 
regarded as self-sufficient. 
Category 5 
Rich peasant or capitalist farmer, owning more than twenty hectares. 
Capitalist farmers are differentiated from rich peasants by virtue of 
carrying out capital intensive agriculture, by the use of tractors, 
investment in irrigation etc. 
A key issue in this typology is the categorisation of households in 
terms of their tendency to hire labour or to work as hired labourers. The 
importance of income from wage labour is a crucial indicator of the 
qualitative differences between households in terms of self-
sufficiency/independence. The poorest category of householders rarely, if 
ever, hire labour. People from households in categories 4 and 5 rarely, if 
ever, work as hired labourers, although individuals may earn income from 
military or other career occupations. Households in categories 2 and 3 
may both employ labour and provide wage labour to other households. 
This is because some agricultural tasks require large inputs of labour for a 
short time. The general trend, however, is for households in category 2 to 
be substantially dependent on wage-income (they are net suppliers of 
labour) whereas those in category 3 have substantially less dependence on 
wage income and may even be net employers of labour, although only 
slightly so. Those in categories 4 and 5 are net employers of labour. 
The use of specific landholding sizes as numerical thresholds for each 
category is obviously arbitrary. The numerical ranking is useful only to 
the extent that it is a tool which helps to identify qualitatively different 
categories. However there is a logical basis for selecting the thresholds 
and the results are quite consistent with variou~ observations made during 
fieldwork. 
Firstly, there is the question of the logical basis. The average 
household size in Hinganiya in 1985 was 4.8 consumption units. The 
average has been calculated using both full-time and part-time 
population. A consumption unit is based on the rather arbitrary 
assumption that adults consume about equal amounts and that children 
consume about half the amounts of food and other resources as adults do. 
In practice in the field it did not prove practical to obtain data on the ages 
of all offspring and, in fact, I am unable to differentiate consistently 
between infants, young children and adolescents from my census and 
genealogical data. So I have treated each married adult or unmarried 
person judged to be seventeen or older as a consumption unit and 
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everyone else as a half unit. I assume that infants will balance 
adolescents. The concept does not differentiate between the food 
requirements of an adult man and the requirements of an adult woman. 
Nor does it allow for increased energy requirements during peak work 
periods. The notion of consumption unit has, therefore, only a very 
general indicative value, but it is a more refined basis for estimate than 
simple household numbers. 
According to estimates by informants, an average adult male requires 
between twenty and twenty-four kilograms of millet per month. This is 
quite consistent with my own observations and estimates, although I did 
not carry out test weighings. I would stress, however, that villagers are 
acutely aware of such matters as the weight of grain and many 
households routinely weigh production after harvest. Loans of grain (for 
household consumption) are also weighed. It is reasonable to assume, 
then, that villagers' estimates are fairly accurate. One qualification about 
the average is that poorer people have much less varied diets and may eat 
somewhat more millet than those in wealthier households. The ration of 
grain provided by the government as famine relief was twenty-two 
kilograms per month, which is close to the other estimates discussed 
above. Accepting this figure as a working estimate, then the requirement 
for an average household (of 4.8 consumption units) for a year is 1267 Kg 
of millet. 
In converting these figures into expected outcomes for small 
landholders there are some qualifications. It is a common practice to 
leave land fallow occasionally. Smaller holders tend to be unable to carry 
out this practice as regularly as larger holders. Very small holders also 
tend to place emphasis on millet production only. For these reasons lower 
productivity from smaller holdings might be expected as land 
deteriorates. This would suggest that a landholder with twelve bighas 
(about two hectares) would produce somewhere between 1200 and 1800 
Kg of grain in a good year, probably something closer to the lower figure 
than the higher one. (See Chapter 6.) In a good year this would meet 
household grain requirements and possibly provide a slight surplus for 
storage, sale or barter. Where there is reduced production due to drought 
a grain deficit would be inevitable. 
Households with five hectares would be able to produce somewhere 
around 3000 Kg in a good year, allowing for some land remaining fallow 
or being placed under mixed crops. Assuming one good year in four, two 
years with about 50% production and one year with little or no 
production, the average annual production over a four year period would 
be 1500 Kg, enough to meet average grain requirements. An average 50% 
production is, in fact, very optimistic (see Chapter 6). Households with 
five hectares would have some years of serious deficit. The further 
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landholdings are above the five hectare threshold, the more likely the 
household is to be self-sufficient. 
Of course these thresholds are arbitrary, but I would suggest that they 
approximately indicate points at which qualitative differences in the level 
of self-sufficiency begin to appear. Observational data on the extent to 
which households are self-sufficient is generally consistent with these 
thresholds and tends to confirm that they represent qualitative differences. 
Firstly, my census of Hinganiya of December 1985-January 1986 shows a 
close association between landholdings owning less than five hectares 
(categories 1 and 2) and emigrant labour. Of eleven people identified as 
part-time emigrant labourers nine were from households which were 
landless or in categories 1 and 2, one was from a household in category 
three and one was from a household in category 4. The emigrant labourer 
in category 3 was from a household holding only a fraction of a hectare 
above the threshold. 
The case of the household above the ten hectare limit (in category 4) is 
also barely above the appropriate threshold. It is the case of a Bishnoi 
household of four (household head, wife, widowed adult son and the 
female daughter of the household head) in which the son worked fairly 
regularly in Jodhpur and the household head himself very occasionally 
did the same. (Only the son has been counted as a part-time resident.) I 
have no knowledge of any particular factors which might explain the 
need for additional cash. It may be that it is all simply a matter of 
economic opportunism - taking the opportunity to collect some extra 
cash. The household is part of a cluster which includes three other 
households headed by the other three sons of the household head. This is 
one of the cases where household and household cluster have somewhat 
blurred boundaries. Three of the four households live in the same dhani, 
although each is regarded as a separate household. Presumably the close 
proximity of the households, with the opportunities for cooperation in 
labour it provides, frees some members of the household cluster to work 
in Jodhpur. The young man's widower status suggests that he may work 
in Jodhpur as much for some sense of independence as for anything else. 
The second way in which observations support the validity of the 
thresholds relates to observations about wage labour (and famine relief 
labour) in the village itself. I do not have comprehensive data on this, but 
my field notes contain frequent references to the composition of work 
parties. I have no evidence of people from households in categories four 
or five working as wage labourers. On the other hand people from most 
households in category 3 were sometimes observed doing wage labour, 
although these households may have been net employers of labour. There 
were only two households in category 3 from which I have no record of 
individuals doing wage labour. One is the case of a Rajput household 
(just under the ten hectare threshold) from which two members were in 
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'service' in Jodhpur. People in categories 1 and 2 were frequently 
observed working for wages. 
It is important to stress that references to wage labour above refer to 
agricultural labour, paid labour on domestic projects or famine work. 
Work at adolas (voluntary working parties - discussed in Chapter 6) or 
other voluntary or cooperative work is not included, even if food was 
provided. 
All of this observational evidence supports the view that the thresholds 
I have used coincide fairly closely with points at which qualitative 
differences in the capacity of households for self-sufficiency emerge. 
Obviously some cases will occur where households do not easily fit into 
categories, but the thresholds are surprisingly reliable indicators of 
agricultural self-sufficiency. I cannot stress the importance of this too 
much. My objective was to develop meaningful categories. I attempted to 
develop a numerical basis for placing individual households. Essentially 
it works. However, the fact that a numerical scale is used should not 
obscure the qualitative/structural basis for the classification. The 
coincidence of qualitative and numerical ranking occurs, despite my 
concerns about using a ranking system which does not take account of 
consumption requirements. I suspect that this may be because household 
size is relatively uniform and relatively small at the lower end of the scale 
of landholding sizes. In fact, of the total of 37 households owning less 
than five hectares, only three households have more than seven members. 
Thus, the households with small landholdings rarely exceed the average 
of 4.8 consumption units per household. (I will further discuss the 
relationship between household size and landholding in Chapter 8.) 
The threshold of twenty hectares for rich peasants and capitalist 
farmers is quite arbitrary. The main basis for selecting twenty hectares is 
that the land ceiling on unirrigated land in the Bhopalgarh Tehsil is 135 
bighas (21.6 hectares). Thus twenty hectares seems to represent a major 
departure from the normal situation. The cases in which the land ceiling 
are exceeded are all apparently explained in terms of increases to the 
ceiling to allow for large households. 
The category 'capitalist farmer' is virtually an empty category in 
Hinganiya itself. At first sight it may appear odd that little investment in 
capital intensive projects has occurred, particularly given that there are 
four households owning holdings over twenty hectares. The answer lies 
in the fact that opportunities for capital investment are limited. Athreya et 
al. (1986) analysed class differences in farming in south India, examining 
both wet and dry areas. Wet, in this case, refers to canal-irrigated land. 
The dry area depends on rainfall for water. They found that opportunities 
for capital investment on dry land were comparatively limited, private 
irrigation works providing the main opportunity. For this reason capitalist 
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farming was proportionately less common (in comparison to middle 
peasantry) in dry areas than in wet areas. These generalisations would be 
equally true of my field area. In adjoining villages several individuals 
have invested in private wells and pumps and have flourishing land as a 
result. However, in Hinganiya, the depth of the water table, and the 
salinity of the existing wells, means that this option is not viable. The 
opportunities for capitalist investment in agriculture are very limited. 
Only one household could be said to have made any capital 
investments of any significance and that on a small scale. This household, 
the largest in size and the one with the largest landholdings, owned half-
share in a tractor, which the household used on its own land and for hire. 
The tractor was purchased in 1983. By 1987 it had been sold. The use of 
tractors to intensify farming has limited use. No tractor owner with only 
unirrigated land would be able to use his tractor enough to j·Jstify the Rs 
70,000 cost, so there is a heavy dependence on hiring tractors to other 
farmers. The main uses for a tractor, besides occasional use as transport 
for people to fairs and so forth, are for ploughing, for crushing crops prior 
to threshing and for carrying harvested crops (or water, in a bad year). 
These activities are limited by the fact that there is only one crop per 
year. Thus a tractor will be of economic value mainly for a few 
operations in peak periods of high demand within a five month 
agricultural season. In bad years there is even less potential for use. 
The potential for hiring out a tractor is further limited by the fact that 
smaller farmers usually cannot afford to hire a tractor and, in any case, 
find the use of a bullock or camel drawn plough quite adequate for their 
relatively small plots. Unirrigated land is usually only ploughed once, in 
any case. 
A tractor, then, is used relatively intensively for a few peak periods 
within the growing season. Occasionally tractors might be hired from 
another village if the local tractor happens to be occupied, but generally a 
single tractor meets most of the needs of the village. Capital investment 
in a second tractor is not likely to be particularly helpful for self-
cultivation or as a source of additional income from hire. 
In this section I have developed a typology of economic categories 
based on the assumption that there is a land-wealth nexus. One 
disadvantage of this typology is that it does not allow for the ranking of 
pastoralists. Within Hinganiya, however, there are no full-time 
pastoralists, and only two or three households whose income from 
pastoralism probably exceeds income from agriculture. In one of these 
cases pastoralism apparently became possible because the householder 
has a source of income from outside the pastoral sector. I will be showing 
the role of non-agricultural inputs in determining economic status later. 
For the present, however, the typology will suffice. 
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An Analysis of Landholdings in Hinganiya 
(a) Overview 
The administratively defined boundaries of Hinganiya encompass a 
total of 735.3 ha. Table 5.1 gives a breakdown of this into major 
categories. (Although the present tense is used I am referring to the 
situation according to the land register in January 1986.) 
The total amount of land held by people not normally resident is a 
significant proportion of the total land available for private purposes 
(34.47%). Most of this land is held by people resident in nearby, usually 
adjoining, villages. There is no evidence of urban dwellers owning land, 
except in the case of a few people who are immediately linked with 
resident households and who are likely to re-settle. In these cases 
landholdings are small. I have already pointed out that residents of 
Hinganiya may own land in other villages. While I know of only one such 
case, it is reasonable to assume that the pattern of absentee ownership of 
land in Hinganiya is similar to the pattern of Hinganiya residents owning 
land elsewhere. In Hinganiya some land is held by Brahmans and 
Goswamis. These people are descendants of temple priests (pujaris) who 
had access to 'temple land' prior to land reform. These aside, most of the 
absentee ownership involves Bishnois, Jats and Rajputs, castes which 
generally held relatively large amounts of land. (Table 5.2 gives a 
breakdown of absentee landholdings in Hinganiya by caste). It is 
probably reasonable to assume that those residents of Hinganiya who 
hold outside land are from similar categories. Thus, the figures for the 
poorer (usually lower caste) farmers in Hinganiya are likely to be more 
reliable than those for the wealthier (usually upper caste) farmers. 
Table 5.1 
Summary of Hinganiya landholdings 
Identified resident landholders, including part-time residents 
Absentee (landholders permanently resident outside village)* 
Total private land 
Panchayat (common) land 
Total 
451.47 ha 
237.47 ha 
688.94 ha 
46.36 ha 
735.3 ha 
* Includes 5.85 ha held in name of person allegedly from Hinganiya 
(according to land records and the Patwari) but unknown to me. 
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Table 5.2 
Absentee ownership of land in Hinganiya, by caste 
Caste Ha. 
Rajput* 42.1 
Bishnoi 122.15 
Jat 48.81 
Nayak 8.26 
Brahman!Goswami 16.15 
Total 237.47 
* Includes 5.85 ha held in name of person allegedly from Hinganiya 
(according to land records and the Patwari) but unknown to me. 
The following analysis excludes the element of absentee 
landownership (unless it is clearly indicated otherwise) both in terms of 
outsiders owning land in Hinganiya and in terms of Hinganiya residents 
owning land elsewhere. 
Taking the 451.47 ha owned by people normally resident in Hinganiya 
(this includes part-time residents) the average landholding per household 
is 6.74 ha. The average per individual is 1.04 ha. These averages are quite 
high by an all-India standard, but it must be remembered that the land is 
of poor quality, being very sandy and also being entirely unirrigated. 
On the basis of the typology of rural 'classes' developed in the 
previous section, I have ranked all sixty-two landholding resident (full-
time and part-time) households in Table 5.3. Note that there are also five 
households which are effectively landless. There are some irregularities 
about each of these. Three of the household heads are part-time residents, 
either in the army or working in Jodhpur. They hold no land in a de jure 
sense, and are not regarded as being landholders in a de facto sense. In 
each case future partitions of land may change their status. Of the other 
two landless households, one is the household of an old man who has 
already distributed all of his land to his sons, while being regarded as the 
head of his own separate household. His household could be regarded as 
dependent on others in the household cluster. The final case is that of a 
household which is apparently in a transitional stage: it is regarded as 
separate, but no land has yet been transferred. For the purposes of Table 
5.3, I have excluded the five landless households as being, each in some 
way, anomalous. 
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Table 5.3 
Landed households. Average size of holding 
by class and percentage of total land by class 
%age of 
Class/ Holding No. of total Average Total %age of 
category range house- house- size land land 
(ha) holds holds (ha) (ha) (ha) 
5 20+ 4 6.45 28.2 112.80 24.99 
4 10-<20 16 25.81 12.39 198.26 43.91 
3 5-<10 10 16.13 7.24 72.36 16.03 
2 2-<5 15 24.19 3.17 47.52 10.53 
0-<2 17 27.42 1.2 20.53 4.55 
Total 62 100 7.28 451.47 lOO.Dl* 
• - Error due to rounding 
The first thing to note is that only twenty households (32% of the 
total) fall within the top two classes, that is, the classes which can be 
described as agriculturally self-sufficient. Sixty-eight per cent of 
households (the lower three classes) are to some extent dependent on 
income from sources other than their own land. In the case of the 
seventeen households (27.4%) owning less than two hectares, other 
sources of income are very important. 
The average size of holdings within each category and the percentage 
of total land held by that category are also set out. The distribution is 
quite uneven in these terms. The four households in Category 5 (6.45% of 
all landed households) own 24.99% of the land. At the other end of the 
scale, the seventeen households in Category I (27 .42% of landed 
households) own only 4.55% of the land. The twenty households in 
categories 4 and 5 (32.26% of landed households) own 68.9% of the land. 
The 42 households in the lowest three categories (67.74% of landed 
households) own only 31.11% of the land. 
(b) Landholdings and Caste 
The association between landholding and caste is very marked, but 
presents some important irregularities. Table 5.4 gives the average 
landholdings per household and per head of population by caste. The 
averages suggest an association between caste status and economic status. 
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Nevertheless there is a large variation in the range of landholding sizes 
within castes. This is evident in Table 5.5. The Rajputs have the largest 
average holdings on both a per person and a per household basis. While 
all four households in Category 5 (the largest landholding class) are 
Rajputs, the Rajputs are represented in all categories. They are even 
present, for what it is worth, considering the anomalies discussed above, 
in the landless category. In fact there are more Rajput households in 
Category 1 than there are in category 5 and the total number in categories 
4 and 5 (ten) is only greater than the total number in categories 1 and 2 
(nine) by one. This means that the Rajputs cover the entire range of 
landholding size categories, being the only caste to do so. The Bishnois 
are confined to the three middle landed categories and are not represented 
at all in either of the extreme categories. The single Jat household also 
falls in the centre. The landed Meghwals all fall in categories 2 and 3. 
The Meghwal household in Category 3 is, in fact, right on the threshold 
between the categories. All Nayak households fall within the two lowest 
landed categories. 
Table 5.4 
Landholdings by caste 
Average Average 
Caste Total No. of land/ No. of land/ 
land households household persons person 
Rajput 222.51 23 9.67 !55 1.43 
Bishnoi 176.03 21 8.38 142 1.24 
Jat 7.84 I 7.84 7 1.12 
Meghwal 15.25 5 3.05 25 0.61 
Nayak 29.84 17 1.75 104 0.29 
Total 451.57 67 6.74 433 1.04 
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Table 5.5 
Range of sizes of landholdings by 
numbers of households and by caste 
Class/ Total No. 
Category Ha households Rajputs Bishnoi Jat Nayak Meghwal 
5 20+ 4 4 
4 10-<20 16 6 10 
3 5-<10 10 2 6 1 
2 2-<5 15 4 3 5 3 
0>-<5 17 5 12 
nil 5 2 2 
Total 67 23 21 17 5 
There is a clear relationship between caste and landholding in all 
castes except the Raj puts. This raises two important questions: 
• Why do caste differences in landholding still appear so striking, 
despite land reform? 
• Why do the Rajputs diverge from the pattern of a close relationship 
between caste and landholding? 
A look at the effects of land reform in Hinganiya will help to answer 
these questions. 
(c) The Effects of Land Reform in Hinganiya 
Earlier I suggested that the most important indicator of the 
effectiveness of land reform is the gross distribution of land. Clearly land 
reform in Hinganiya did not achieve a great deal in this respect as my 
analysis of the various tables showing the variations in the size of 
landholdings and the distribution of land by caste has shown. It is 
particularly clear that, whatever the effects of land reform, the lower 
ranked castes (that is, the scheduled tribes and castes) are still relatively 
poorly off in terms of land. In this section I want to examine the land 
records to ascertain to what extent the balance has changed, given the fact 
that it is pretty obviously skewed. 
Fortunately there is a record of the rights which existed in Hinganiya 
not long before land reform. A land settlement was made in 1947. The 
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papers are available in Jodhpur and I was able to transcribe the details. 
Using these records, it is possible to ascertain some indications of the 
shifts in land ownership between castes and it is sometimes possible to 
trace the broad outlines of what happened to particular households. There 
are some limitations in interpretation, however. 
• It is not possible, from the data I have, to ascertain whether 
proprietorial rights or tenancy of particular plots of land were 
transferred sometime between 1947 and the period of land reform 
or after land reform. The 1947 situation simply has to be taken as 
the point of comparison because I have no intermediate data. 
• It is sometimes possible to trace the movement of individual plots 
of land because both the 1947 land register and the 1986 land 
register give plot numbers. However plots are sometimes split and 
renumbered. From the continuity of plot numbers in the possession 
of identifiable individuals and their descendants (in some cases the 
same individuals actually appear as landowners in both 1947 and 
1986) any renumbering appears to have been minimal, but there is 
no way of confirming this. I was unable to obtain a usable copy of 
either the 1947 or 1986 maps which indicate plot location and 
numbers. 
• There are a number of people on the 1947 register who I was 
unable to match with people on genealogies even after questioning 
older informants. In some cases these people were absentee 
landholders or tenants. In some cases individuals seem to be 
identified by reference to a father whose name differs from the 
name given in the genealogies. This may be the result of different 
names being given to the same person in the construction of my 
genealogies and on the land register, or it may result from the fact 
that a person was an adopted son of a person who simply does not 
appear on my genealogies. 
In 1947 Hinganiya was under a joint jagir, consisting of a resident 
Raj put of the Bhati clan and an absentee Rajput of the Tanwar clan. The 
latter was resident in Jodhpur. Each of the joint Thakurs held a half share. 
A number of relatives of the Bhati Thakur also held smaller grants of 
jagir land. For convenience I will describe these as sub-jagirdars. The 
sub-jagir lands were often held jointly by several Rajputs and the 
resulting shares were often quite small. Close relatives of the Thakur, 
described in the register as the Thakur's brothers, held larger shares than 
more distant relatives. Both the joint Thakurs and the sub-jagirdars held 
some land for self-cultivation and let the rest to tenants. In the case of the 
smaller joint holders of sub-jagirs the land was sometimes held by one 
combination of sets of siblings and let out to tenants in another 
combination of sets of siblings. Individual Rajputs may have held a share 
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of a particular plot as sub-jagir holders and been part-tenants of the same 
plot. In these situations calculation of the rights of a particular individual 
are dazzlingly complex. 
Besides the land used by Rajputs for self-cultivation, and a small 
amount of temple land for self-cultivation by the pujaris, the only land 
not let to tenants was the land held for public purposes, including land for 
wells, roads, the cremation ground and the village residential area 
(abadi). Table 5.6 presents a summary of all land in Hinganiya in 1947, 
identified (apart from public or temple land) by the caste of the person 
using the land. The category of Rajput land-users includes land used for 
self-cultivation by Rajputs and land used by Rajput tenants. The 1947 
figures are compared to the 1986 figures for land ownership. Thus the 
principles of classification shift from land user (including both persons 
holding rights as proprietor and tenants) in 1947 to persons holding 
proprietorial rights only in 1986. 
These figures do not separate non-residents and residents. While it is 
possible to do so for 1986, it is impossible to do so for 194 7. As most 
absentees came from nearby villages in 1986 and the situation was 
presumably similar in 1947 (tenants, almost by definition, are likely to 
live nearby) the figures are comparable. 
The table demonstrates one point conclusively: while the basis under 
which people in various castes gained access to land in 1947 and 1986 
was different, there were only minor shifts in the distribution of access by 
caste. Very small variations to areas used for temples and public lands 
can possibly be explained by a resurvey or resurveys since 1947 corning 
up with slightly different areas for different plots. There are, however, 
some genuine changes which should be examined. 
Firstly, the Daroga tenant of 1947 has disappeared from consideration. 
He was certainly an absentee tenant, presumably from a nearby village, 
since all of my informants are adamant that no Daroga has ever lived in 
Hinganiya. The plot number held against his name now appears as the 
property of a Rajput living just outside the village boundaries, although 
the area has approximately been halved, which suggests a division since 
1947. 
In general a small decrease in the land available to Rajputs has 
allowed increases to land available to the Bishnois, Meghwals and 
Nayaks and a very small increase to Jats. 
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Table 5.6 
The effects of land reform. 
Shift in land access by caste- 1947-86 
Caste 1947 (ha) 1986 (ha) %age change 
Rajput 
Jagir (self-cult) 38.1 
Jagir' s relatives (self-cult) 15.44 
Jagir's brothers (self-cult) 172.76 
Rajput tenants 57.51 
Total Rajput 283.81 264.6 -6.77 
Tenants ( 1947) 
Bishnoi 278.44 298.18 + 7.09 
Jat 55.25 56.65 + 2.53 
Meghwa1 7.95 15.25 +91.82 
Nayak 33.77 38.1 +12.82 
Daroga 6.96 -100.00 
Other 
Temple 15.97 16.15 +1.13 
Public 46.15 46.36 +0.45 
Total 728.3 735.3 +0.96 
Note: The discrepancy in totals is presumably due to a resurvey done since 1947 
While the percentage increase to Meghwals is considerable, the actual 
amount of land is n~t, since they hold so littl!! land anyhow. In fact the 
entire difference is accounted for by the transfer of a single plot, held by 
the joint Thakurs for self-cultivation in 1947. All other plots used by the 
Meghwals as tenants in 1947 are now held by Meghwals. During my 
1985-86 fieldwork there was a legal dispute over the single transferred 
plot, which had been purchased by some Meghwals from one of the 
former Thakurs, in fact the Bhati Thakur. The descendants of the now 
deceased co-Thakur (of the Tanwar clan) had claimed that their father had 
never been paid by the Bhati Thakur for his share of the sale. I was 
unable to find out when the sale occurred, but it was presumably since 
land reform. 
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In the case of the Nayaks, all plots for which there were Nayak tenants 
in 1947 are held by the descendants of the particular Nayak tenants, with 
the exception of a single batch of three plots (totalling just under four 
hectares) apparently purchased since land reform. 
The fact that a large proportion of the land previously used by rent 
paying tenants is now used by people holding proprietary rights is an 
important change given that tenancy before land reform was insecure and 
rent was high. On the other hand the reform has been less than 
revolutionary because there has been very limited change in terms of the 
distribution of access to land on a caste basis. Assuming the land wealth 
nexus, there has been no major change in the relative economic status of 
various castes. The tenant castes (Bishnois and Jats) are now middle 
peasants. The village service castes are now poor peasants. The places of 
castes in the hierarchical structure have not changed. 
The reason why the caste-based structure of the rural hierarchy didn't 
change with land reform is straightforward. The main emphasis of land 
reform legislation was in transferring title to land to those who were 
already using it. The question of transferring surplus land to the 
scheduled castes and tribes applied only to surplus land used by jagirdars 
for self cultivation, not surplus land used by tenants. The tenants 
themselves got that land. In a small village like Hinganiya, which was a 
petty jagir anyhow, and where quite a lot of land had been granted to 
various Rajput relatives of the Bhati Thakur, there simply wasn't much 
available land. It is also quite likely that surplus land held by the jagirdar 
for self-cultivation was given to other Rajputs as tenants when the 
possibility of land reform looked imminent. Such land would be 
transferred under land reform legislation to the Rajput tenant, not treated 
as surplus land for transfer to scheduled castes and tribes. There is some 
evidence that this may have occurred. 
If we examine the land held by the joint Thakurs for self-cultivation in 
I 947 we find that, in 1986, only three plots were no longer held by the 
adopted son of the Bhati Thakur or the sons of the Tanwar Thakur. Of 
these, one plot is the one sold to the Meghwals and currently under 
dispute. TI1e other two plots were still held by Rajputs in 1986. I do not 
know when the transfers from Thakur to other Rajputs occurred, but the 
land was apparently never treated as surplus land for the purposes of 
transfer to scheduled castes or tribes. It therefore seems likely that land 
reform may have been to some extent bypassed by the simple expedient 
of obtaining Rajput tenants rather than leaving land as surplus. This 
would not have .avoided the loss to the landholder, but would have kept 
the land within the Rajput caste. This is, of course, supposition, but it is 
plausible and at least explains how land remained Rajput land. There is 
no reason, of course, why favoured Bishnoi or Jat households might not 
have received land in the same way. 
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There are certain other ways in which certain Rajputs, closely linked 
with the jagirdar or his descendants, have maintained large holdings. I 
have already mentioned that there are four households in category 5, that 
is with land in excess of twenty hectares. In fact each of these households 
owns land in excess of the nominal land ceiling of 135 bighas (21.6 ha). 
In each case, however, the household size is in excess of the standard size 
of five for which the ceiling is calculated. On a pro rata basis each 
household technically owns land within the limit for its household size. 
Case I. Holding 35.8 ha. 
This household has the largest landholding in the village and is also 
the largest household. There are seventeen members (one of whom is in 
the army and is therefore a part-time resident). The land is registered in 
three names: the household head (14.59 ha), his brother who is in the 
army (15.34 ha) and their mother (5.85 ha). As the amounts of land 
owned individually by the brothers are less than the land ceiling, there is 
no direct connection between household size and the need to beat the 
ceiling by maintaining a large household. The joint family structure is 
apparently largely determined by the exigencies of looking after the 
military brother's large and young family. A third brother heads a 
separate household. He recently joined the Rajasthan Armed 
Constabulary and has a young child. While he is the youngest brother he 
heads a separate household because he has received his land (14.9 ha) 
through adoption from his father's brother, whose wife is still the 
registered landholder. The household is emphatically regarded as 
separate, but is, in fact co-resident. The effects of the adoption are to keep 
the land owned by the previous generation intact within the household 
cluster. 
Case 2. Holding 30.24 ha. 
The household head, whom I will call Nahar Singh (not his correct 
name), is the brother of the previous Thakur (and the genitor of the 
current Thakur). Figure 5.1 shows the household and its place in the Bhati 
Thakur lineage. With a household consisting of nine members (including 
one part-time member), Nahar Singh is not in breach of the land ceiling. 
However, he has had to juggle two different requirements. On the one 
hand there is the need to have a household large enough to enable the 
land ceiling to be raised so as to avoid loss of land. On the other hand 
there is the need to minimise the number of heirs who will obtain full 
shares when the land is partitioned. 
In all there were originally five sons and six daughters. All of the 
daughters are now married or deceased. At present two married sons and 
their wives and children are household members (one son is a part-time 
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member). All of the household head's other sons inherited land by 
adoption from other Rajputs. By maintaining a joint household 
comprising the wives and children of two of his sons, Nahar Singh has 
maintained the household numbers required to meet the land ceiling 
exemption requirements. He has managed to avoid having too many heirs 
by having his sons adopted to kinsmen without sons so that they will no 
longer inherit from him. It is, of course, rather fortunate that so many of 
his male kin (including two brothers) died without male offspring. 
Nevertheless, the fact that a strategy depends on some luck doesn't stop it 
from being a good strategy. The sons left in his own household will 
inherit a sizable holding after his death. Further, the land held by 
deceased ancestors has been held within the lineage, at least for the 
current generation. I do not wish to suggest that Nahar Singh had a large 
family in order to achieve these aims. However, he has responded to the 
situation by manipulating household size to delay partition of his 
landholdings. 
Case 3. Holding 25.26 ha. 
This household has seven members.The eldest son (who is classified 
as a part-time resident) is married. The household head has four sons 
and five daughters. All of the daughters are married. Again it is clear that 
having a large family has advantages in allowing a household to own in 
excess of the land ceiling. In the next generation, however, the land will 
be split four ways. 
Case 4. 21.51 ha. 
The household head is the current Thakur, adopted son of the previous 
Thakur and son of the Rajput in Case 2. There are six members of the 
household. 
It seems to me to be significant that all of the households which 
exceed the 21.6 ha bigha limit have household sizes sufficient to enable 
them to fall within the adjusted limits for large households. Further, each 
household has a joint family structure, and in two cases siblings of the 
household head, or sons of the household head, have received land 
through adoption. In one case the household head himself was adopted. In 
the only case where adoption was not a factor the household head has 
several daughters, now married. It seems to me that large joint 
households and large numbers of children provide the flexibility which 
allows household size to be built up to a size adequate to maintain land 
ceiling requirements. Some of the implications of this will be followed up 
later. 
A final question which remains to be answered is why the distribution 
of land within the Rajput caste is so skewed. The current distribution is 
comparatively easily explained. Apart from those who have managed to 
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purchase land since 1947 and those who have sold or lost surplus land 
through land reform, Rajput landownership today is a result of the 
inheritance of land for which user's rights were held before land reform. 
The question, then, is not to explain the current distribution, but to 
explain why rights were so unevenly distributed before land reform. 
The above discussion shows that the Rajputs most closely related to 
the jagirdars were the ones who held the most land. Other Rajputs were 
comparatively disadvantaged. But why should they have been worse off 
than the tenant castes, the Bishnois and the Jats? Nowadays it is from the 
poorer Rajput households that most people go into military service. 
Presumably the same applied in the period before land reform. It has been 
suggested to me (Neil Maclean, pers. comm.) that the answer may be 
asssociated with the need for the Thakur to maintain a pool of potential 
soldiers. Too generous a distribution of land amongst Rajputs would 
certainly have made it difficult for ajagirdar to meet his obligations for 
the provision of troops when the rekh was assessed in terms of military 
obligations. Even in the later 'feudal' period, when the jagirdar had no 
such obligations, those Rajputs who chose a military career would have 
been unable to farm large landholdings and would not have needed them 
for their support. There is a clear tendency for those Rajputs with little 
land to be associated with a tradition of military service. Case 1 in 
Chapter 9 involves a lineage, with relatively little land in 1947, which has 
a tradition of at least three successive generations of military service. 
(d) Tenancy 
There are some ways of defeating the limits to household staple 
production imposed by land ownership. Legally, land tenancy is restricted 
in Rajasthan. Except in the cases of nominated categories (such as 
widows, minors or servicemen), landholders are not permitted to enter 
into long-term tenancy agreements. The maximum permitted period of 
tenancy (except when the owner is in an exempt category) is five years. 
Details of existing tenancies are very hard to obtain, largely because 
most tenancy agreements are outside the provisions of the legislation. 
Consequently, people are reluctant to discuss them. Even when a 
particular tenancy is legal (when the legal owner is a widow, for 
example) there is a great reluctance to register agreements. However, 
despite the difficulty in obtaining systematic information, tenancy 
appears to be relatively common. 
Hissar, the most common form of tenancy, requires the tenant to pay a 
fixed proportion of the crop to the landowner. The proportion varies; 
sometimes it is one third, sometimes it is fifty percent. In hissar the 
tenant provides aU seeds and labour, but has to pay the landowner only 
on the basis of actual production. In another form of tenancy (harsal) a 
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fixed fee is paid before sowing. The risk, therefore is entirely for the 
tenant. This latter form does not, apparently, exist in Hinganiya. Given 
the risk of crops failing it would have little to offer to a tenant. 
I have information on only four tenancy arrangements. In all cases the 
landowners are Rajputs. Three of the tenants are also Raj puts, while one 
is a Meghwal. This is, however, not a complete list of all arrangements in 
Hinganiya and the apparent predominance of Rajputs as tenants almost 
certainly reflects the fact that one or two Rajput informants were 
forthcoming on the subject. 
Interestingly, one of the Rajput tenants himself owned about seventy 
bighas (over 10 ha). He farmed an additional twelve bighas (2 ha) on the 
tenancy arrangement, leaving about twenty bighas of his own land fallow. 
This raises an important point. Apart from the obvious advantages of 
larger landholdings, there are advantages in terms of flexibility. Large 
landholders are able to rotate their crops and keep some land fallow. On 
the other hand, small landowners tend to limit their crops to millet, which 
is the staple, and to exploit all their land. In the long term this means that 
smaller landholdings would be expected to become less productive. Small 
landowners may be able to leave land fallow if they are able to obtain a 
tenancy agreement. 
The ultimate limit to the number of tenancy arrangements is the 
amount of land available which is surplus to the needs of the owner. In 
fact, this is relatively limited and would generally belong only to 
landowners in landholding categories 4 a'nd 5, although I know of one 
case of a category 3 landowner who has a tenant. 
What are the advantages of a tenancy arrangement? To a landowner 
they are obvious. In a good year he obtains a substantial share of crop 
without any increased inputs. In a bad year he loses nothing. In fact he 
gains because any preliminary work or seed costs for which he might 
otherwise have been responsible are borne by the tenant. There are no 
risks for the landowner. 
From the point of view of the tenant the position varies. It may be a 
means of increasing flexibility, as in the case I mentioned above, or it 
may be a means of increasing overall production beyond potential 
produce from one's own land. 
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Discussion 
In this chapter I have examined the pattern of distribution of 
landholdings in Hinganiya. The main conclusions are as follows: 
• The distribution of landholdings by size is very uneven. 
• There are significant differences in landholdings by caste, both in 
terms of averages per household and in terms of averages per head 
of population. The average landholdings increase as the relative 
ranking of the caste increases. 
• In the cases of all castes except the Rajputs the range of 
landholding sizes per household are limited to two or three adjacent 
categories. The spread of landholding sizes is, thus, relatively 
consistent for each of these castes. 
• The range of landholdings sizes for Rajputs covers all five 
categories, although the caste averages (per household and per 
head) remain higher than those of any other caste. The diversity of 
landholdings among Rajputs probably derives from the fact that the 
Rajputs have always had a sub-class of people not closely related 
to the jagirdar who tended to join the military. 
• In terms of the total amounts of land available for the use of each 
caste, there have been very few changes since land reform took 
place, although the proprietorial rights to land have changed from 
almost total Rajput domination (the exception was land held as 
temple land for self-cultivation by pujaris) in 1947 to a distribution 
of proprietorial rights amongst the users in 1986. 
• Land reform in Hinganiya did not lead to a significant 
redistribution of land. This may be a result of the fact that, in what 
was a small jagir anyhow, land had been effectively distributed to a 
number of Raj put sub-jag irs before land reform. 
As far as the relationship between castes and landholding is 
concerned, the greatest problem of interpretation lies with the Rajputs, 
who cover the entire range of landholding sizes. This range is a striking 
feature of the economic status of the Raj puts in Hinganiya. But there is a 
second striking feature: to a much greater extent than any other caste the 
Rajputs have permanent attachments to non-agricultural sources of 
income. While men from other castes obtain income from migrant labour, 
permanent salaried income (particularly in the army) is almost a 
monopoly of Rajputs. The Rajputs in the lower landholding categories, 
including the nominally landless category, tend to be in 'service' or to be 
retumed military men. In terms of their overall economic position land 
ownership is not an accurate indicator of the wealth of these Rajputs. 
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The land-wealth nexus seems to work for the other castes, but falls 
down in the case of Raj puts. The cases of landless Raj puts and of landless 
Bishnois highlights this fact. The two landless Rajputs both have salaried 
jobs in Jodhpur. The two landless Bishnois, on the other hand, are 
landless by virtue of life cycle factors: one has already settled land on his 
sons and the other is a new household head who has not yet received his 
share of land. Both cases are irregularities which are nevertheless 
consistent with the assumption that wealth is based on land. 
This chapter has examined the 'agrarian hierarchy' in terms of the 
working assumption that land equals wealth. That, while useful as a 
working assumption, is inadequate in two respects. Firstly, it ignores the 
importance of pastoralism as a source of income. While there is a link 
between pastoralism and land ownership it is quite possible for small 
landowners to make substantial income from livestock and there are, in 
any case, nomadic and semi-nomadic herders who make considerable 
income from pastoralism without any need to own land. I will consider 
this in Chapter 6. Secondly it ignores income from outside sources. 
In Chapter 9 I will be pursuing the second of these inadequacies. In 
particular I will be continuing the argument (commenced in Chapter 4) 
that the Rajput caste has certain characteristics which can be turned into 
economic advantages. 
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